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Welcoming Words

We are pleased to present to you the sixth edition of the *Pax et Bellum Journal*. This journal is a student-run peer-reviewed annual publication, published by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research (DPCR) at Uppsala University, and managed by its master students. Our open access policy is motivated by the belief in the free dissemination of knowledge, and as such the present volume, like all previous editions, is freely available on our website: http://www.paxetbellum.org/journal/.

The aim of the *Pax et Bellum Journal* is to provide students of Peace and Conflict Studies worldwide with an opportunity to publish their work, so that they get a chance to share their work and findings with others through a suitable platform, while at the same time gaining valuable experience with the peer review process. The publishing process has, however, been an equally educational experience for us as the Editorial Board.

The present issue consists of three articles, which cover widely varying topics within the field. We would like to thank the authors for taking the time and effort to go through the extensive peer review process. Equally our thanks go out to the peer reviewers at the DPCR for their essential contributions to keeping up the high standard of this publication.

The first contribution is by Juan Diego Duque, a master student at the DPCR at Uppsala University. In this paper, he explores individuals' motivations for joining pro-government militias through a case study of a militia in Colombia. Applying the selective incentives and pleasure of agency theories to this case, he finds that the explanatory power of the former theory trumps that of the latter.

The second contribution is by Davis Ellison, a recent masters graduate from the University of North Carolina. It analyses the efficacy of European level conflict management practices in the EU's extended neighborhood, through a case study of the EUFOR Chad/RCA mission. Through this analysis, Ellison generates the hypothesis that the coherency and effectiveness of EU foreign policy is degraded if the influence of a single Member State with international interest in a crisis grows.

The final article in this issue is authored by Luís Martínez Lorenzo, also a master student at Uppsala University's DPCR. It explores the conditions under which nonviolent anti-occupation conditions are successful, through a case study of nonviolent campaigns in Western Sahara over the course of over a decade. The study finds support for Martínez' argument that external support is likely to be a necessary condition for the success of nonviolent anti-occupation campaigns.

We hope that this issue will provide you with great reading pleasure and food for thought.

The *Pax et Bellum Journal* Editorial Board

An Explanation of Why Individuals Join Pro-Government Militias: The Case of United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

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Author Biography

Juan Diego Duque is a MSC student of Peace and Conflict Studies (2017-2019) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. He holds a bachelor´s degree in Political Science at Universidad Javeriana, Colombia. He has more than four years of experience working in policy-oriented research in Colombia, Brazil, the United States and the Philippines in subjects such as the reintegration of ex-combatants, transitional justice, gender, political violence, and state-building. He also was awarded as Rotary Peace Fellow by Rotary International in order to study his master at Uppsala University.

Abstract

An important puzzle in conflict studies is to understand why some people and not others decide to join armed groups. However, the discipline has just started to understand how pro-government militia (PGM) members joined those groups. The following paper aims to test two relevant theories that explain the causal mechanisms that underlie decisions to join armed groups: selective incentives and pleasure of agency. Using survey data from Colombia, I test the explanatory power of these two theories to explain why some individuals decided to join Las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The results show that material benefits were a more salient reason for ex-combatants to join AUC than pleasure of agency reasons. This result is also consistent with the general discourse and other narratives of AUC.

Introduction

The emergence, dynamics and termination of pro-government militias (PGMs) have been mostly overlooked in conflict and peace studies. Their activities are usually tied to a state's action, assuming that they are always representing the state's interest. However, PGMs do not always act as an extension of the state. PGMs shift their loyalties and pursue agendas which are different from the state (Jentzch et al. 2015), thus PGMs vary across cases, differing on why and how they emerge in ongoing civil wars.

Like other non-state armed actors, PGMs have their own organizational structure and strategic war decisions. Various factors might account for their dynamics, such as the nature of their ties with incumbents, mobilization strategies for recruitment, and strategic decisions to commit violence against civilians. Recruitment is one of the most relevant factors, since PGMs need to create incentives in order to involve and cooperate with civilians in order to reach their military and political goals. However, most of the theoretical discussions on recruitment have focused on rebel groups rather than PGMs (e.g. Wood 2003; Gurr 1970). There are few studies that have scrutinized why individuals decide to join PGMs (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Forney 2015).

Based on the richness of qualitative and quantitative data on paramilitary groups in Colombia, this paper will attempt to answer why individuals decided to participate in the PGM *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (United Self-Defenses Forces of Colombia, or AUC, by its Spanish

acronym)[1]. This paper aims to test the potential explanatory power of two classical rebel recruitment theories, selective incentives and pleasure of agency, and seeks to extend these accounts to PGM-recruitment dynamics. The analysis will use survey data from a representative random sample of ex-combatants in Colombia.

The main findings demonstrate that the selective incentive theory has more explanatory power than the pleasure of agency theory. More than half of the AUC ex-combatants joined the group because they wanted land, money or food; they were looking for stable employment or they wanted to get out of poverty. Despite the theory, agency did not have enough support in the survey data; other sources have shown that AUC members also joined for the pleasure of the military life and to pursue the AUC ideology. Although it is not a common motivation, I identify three different factors which could help in understanding the lack of support for the hypothesis: the variety of recruitment strategies carried out by AUC over time (Ronderos 2014), the role of rank in shaping motivations (Nussio 2010) and research design limitations.

The current paper is divided as follows. Firstly, it will discuss the main arguments of the theories to develop a hypothesis based on the selective incentive and pleasure of agency theories. Secondly, I will explain the research design, followed by the main results and discussions around the theories. Finally, I will draw the main conclusions with some general proposals for further research.

An Extension of Rebel Recruitment Theories to PGM

In order to discuss the theories it is necessary to define how PGM will be understood, given that there are manifold names of PGMs such as 'paramilitaries', 'vigilantes' and 'death squads'. According to Carey and Mitchel (2017, 128) PGMs are "armed groups that are linked to government but exist outside the regular security apparatus, and have some level of organization". This definition is useful because it captures the fact that PGMs may not always have formal links with official security authorities. Thus, the definition considers a broader spectrum of militias or paramilitary groups that could be more or less autonomous in terms of how their operations relate to state behavior, since they are not necessarily integrated into the security structure of the state.

PGMs dynamics and structures vary in terms of armed mobilization, recruitment strategies, military indoctrination, and violent behavior. However, since PGMs are a relatively new topic in the field, there are still few theoretical frameworks which account for why some individuals and not others join PGMs. Theories on recruitment mostly focus on rebel groups through six different causal mechanisms: 1) selective incentive theory (Olson 1965); 2) pleasure of agency (Wood 2003); 3) social networks (Ugarriza and Nussio 2015; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008); 4) relative deprivation theory (Gurr 1970); 5) coercion strategies (Eck 2014) and 6) sensation seeking theory (Nussio 2017). In this article, I will explore in-depth the selective incentive and the pleasure of agency theories using data from Colombia[2].

These two theories are more relevant than others for two reasons. First, the theories present a contested argument. The pleasure of agency is itself a critique of the selective incentive accounts of insurgent mobilization. Wood (2003) states that the selective incentive perspective ignores the idea that people can participate in insurgent movements for moral and emotional

[1] I will use PGM, AUC and paramilitary groups to refer to the same phenomenon across the article.

[2] The paper will only focus on voluntary participation and it does not have the ambition to cover forced recruitment strategies.

reasons. In other words, individuals could decide to join groups for altruistic goals such as social justice instead of more individual benefits. Thus, the discussion between selective incentives and pleasure of agency can be placed within the classical debate on greed and grievance (Collier and Hoeffler 2000), which revolves around the question whether rebel groups have more materialistic reasons rather than political ones for taking up arms.

Second, both theories are extendable to PGM recruitment. The theories of rebel recruitment usually stress that some individuals are pulled into rebel groups either due to a general lack of socio-economic satisfaction (grievance) or through a cost-benefit decision to resolve their material problems (greed). Unlike rebel groups, PGMs usually have access to a larger pool of resources because of their bonds with local elites and governments. This increases their capacity to offer material incentives to enrich their recruits. One could also see this as an argument to support the selective incentive theory.

Finally, individuals may also decide to violently protect the status quo from guerrilla movements as an emotional and moral reflection to protect their wealth, families and life, and thus have motivations strongly linked to the ideas of the pleasure of agency. In other words, we could argue that individuals could join PGMs due to selective incentives or moral and emotional commitment. I will look at the AUC as a case study to see which of these two theories better explains individuals' motivations to join the AUC.

I exclude from the analysis the other theories due to data limitations and lacking level of relevance. The social network, sensation seeking, and forced recruitment theories are plausible explanations for some individual motivations to join PGMs, however, they are beyond the scope of this research. I deliberately chose theories that speak more closely to the debate of greed vs. grievance since it is not a concluded debate in the PGM literature. In the following part, I will briefly explain the selective incentive and pleasure of agency theories, outlining their causal stories to understand how these theories could be extended to PGMs.

Selective Incentive Theory

The collective action problem, illustrated by Mancur Olson (1965), questioned the assumption that people would participate in collective action because of a normative commitment. According to this theory, public goods such as democracy and rule of law are usually a product of collective action. However, not everyone participates in collective action and not everyone bears the costs of the production of the public good. Thus, some individuals decide to enjoy the benefits of the public good without paying the cost which leads to the classical dilemma of free-riding. Thus, Olson (1965) asked how some people decide to participate in collective action for public goods and not others. He argues that there are selective incentives in the short-term that motivate individuals to participate in collective action in order to reduce the cost of participation.

The puzzle becomes more cumbersome when the discussion turns to the question of why people decide to participate in war. The puzzle here is why people decide to take violent risks in order to carry out collective armed actions. The selective incentive argument holds that individuals need material incentives to participate in highly-risky activities to become a member of a warring party. Individuals assess the costs and benefits of being part of an armed group. Therefore, the individual cost to join the war would be reduced with short-term rewards like salary, food, land, and other material benefits.

This explanation is, in fact, very common within rebel group accounts. As Kalyvas and Kocher (2007, 182) stated "enormous literature on selective incentives within the collective action

tradition provides ample evidence that rebels often received material incentives". Thus, individuals are more tempted into war given that they can obtain special material benefits which will resolve their economic and social problems.

The causal mechanisms for individual participation in a PGM could be explained as follows. Governments and local elites usually endorse PGMs in their aspiration to retain political and economic control which has been threatened by rebel groups. Thus, militia commanders have access to a larger pool of resources to offer to possible recruits, resulting from government and local elites providing the main resources to form PGMs. Taking into account that militia presence could be correlated with a lack of well-developed local economy as well as lack of formal authority, individuals could also perceive their participation as the best option to resolve their economic and security hardships. Therefore, in order to increase their territorial control and strengthen their military capabilities, militia leaders use material benefits to induce individuals to join their groups and create palliative solutions for civilians. Thus, I assume that these material benefits, such as offers of land and salaries in order to participate as a combatant in a PGM, sustain individual motivations to participate in the war.

> *H1: Individuals are more likely to participate in pro-government militias if they expect to receive material incentives.*

Pleasure of Agency Theory

The pleasure of agency theory, developed by Wood (2003), argues that moral commitments and emotional engagements are plausible motivations to account for participation in war. Thus, in the case of El Salvador, Wood (2003) found that *campesinos* claimed pride and joy due to their participation in the insurgent group, interpreting their actions as effective, correct, and fair. This explanation could also be extended to many leftist groups around the world that use political and social discourse to create a social awareness of the social injustices perpetrated by the state. Countries such as Guatemala, Colombia, Perú, Angola, the Philippines, and Vietnam show similar conditions where individuals seem to join rebel groups as a result of their emotional engagement with the revolution.

This theory is also a critique of the selective incentive argument. Wood (2003) criticized it, arguing that it could not completely account for the *campesinos' insurgency* collaboration in El Salvador. The author demonstrates that *campesinos* perceived the access to land in a more moral sense. The participation of *campesinos* in insurgent groups included the occupation of land as an effective action to show a fair commitment to the revolution in order to promote social justice and equity. Therefore, access to land was not seen as a short-term reward or economic benefit in order to decrease the costs of the participation in the insurgency, but it was an effective behavior to put in practice their moral commitment to the insurgency's ideology. This critique is relevant for the discussion on greed and grievance since Wood's (2003) argument points out that material benefits were not the main reason for why *campesinos* joined the revolution during the civil war in El Salvador. In other words, individuals were more grievance-motivated than greed-motivated.

Wood (2003) identifies three reasons in order to account for why *campesinos* joined insurgent collective action in El Salvador: *participation, defiance, and pleasure of agency*. The participation reason is defined as any "contribution is somehow essential to the realization of the commitment" (2003, 234). In other words, *participation* is defined as the motivation that a civilian has to directly contribute to the struggle for social justice. Thus, the participation in the insurgency is valued as

the moral commitment that a combatant has in order to reach a better society. *Defiance* is defined as the feeling of moral outrage at the state's answer to what the insurgents perceived as injustices. Thus, potential recruits perceived insurgent participation like a duty, instead of a pleasure, in order to respect memories of those ones who have died for the struggle for justice. Finally, *the pleasure of agency* reason is linked to the pride of reaching the insurgent goals effectively (distribution of land, defeat of the government, etc.). Hence, potential insurgents could see the progress and successes of insurgencies during the war as a motivation to be part of those whom are "collectively effective in realizing a highly valued goal" (Wood 2003, 236). Wood shows that *campesinos* were proud to show the success of their cooperatives when they claimed land and took it from the landowners in order to distribute the land among themselves.

Drawing on this theory, the causal mechanisms for participation for PGMs work as follows. Individuals would perceive their participation in militias as a contribution to protect their communities from insurgency attacks and to defend the political and economic status quo. Communities might be dissatisfied, extorted, and attacked by insurgencies. Thus, communities attacked by rebel groups will perceive these conditions as unjust and menacing. Individuals could feel a moral outrage against guerrillas and join groups due to injustices committed by rebel groups. Ergo, their participation in PGMs is valued as righteous and fair to protect the status quo and in honor of people who have died due to insurgencies' violence. The success of PGMs to hold back guerrilla groups and to offer security to the communities will also serve as a motivation to participate in the PGMs. Hence, individuals join militia groups not for economic incentives, but rather as an emotional engagement to protect their communal properties and offer public security in order to respect and defend the status quo and the state power in areas were PGMs are present.

> *H2: Individuals are more likely to join the PGM if they believe in the protection of the status quo and the defiance of insurgency attacks as fair and righteous commitments.*

Data and Resources

This paper will use data from a recent survey carried out by Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), a Colombian think tank, in 2008. The survey was conducted on a representative random sample of 1,485 ex-combatants in Colombia. The survey has 846 individuals from AUC who answered questions about their life before joining the group, during wartime, and after their demobilization. The data is a relevant source since it asked directly, in a closed-ended question, why AUC ex-combatants decided to join the PGM. Table 1 shows the corresponding operationalization according to the answers in the survey:

Table 1. Operationalization.

Theory	Independent variable	Indicator (survey answers)
Pleasure of agency	Participation	Support the ideology of the group
Pleasure of agency	Defiance	To want vengeance
Pleasure of agency	Participation	Enjoyment for arms and/or to want a military life
Selective incentive	Material benefits	To want money, land or food
Selective incentive	Material benefits	To want to get out of poverty
Selective incentive	Material benefits	To want stable employment

Source: Elaborated based on the survey questions (FIP 2008).

The material benefits concept is our independent variable for the selective incentive theory. The material benefits could take the form of money, land, or food. However, these are not the only material benefits that individuals might obtain. I argue that *to want to get out of poverty* and *to want stable employment* are selective incentives as well. Civilians that decide to cooperate actively with armed groups as combatants could perceive their participation as a stable job for which they get a salary every month. Then, participation in PGMs could be seen as another common job offered in their localities. Thus, the indicator *to want stable employment* assumes participation in PGMs is driven by the desire to be rewarded with a stable job within the armed group. Therefore, individuals could also perceive their participation as a short-term private benefit, in the form of being an employee in a PGM.

In addition, *to want to get out of poverty* could be seen as another selective incentive. Militias usually hold control over underdeveloped areas where poverty and economic hardships are common issues. Therefore, individuals who face economic hardships perceive their mobilization in PGMs as a way out of poverty through the access to private benefits offered by the PGM. Thus, civilians that decide to join a PGM aim to overcome their economic situation by getting selective rewards rather than the public security offered by the PGM.

The pleasure of agency comprises three different variables: participation, defiance, and pleasure of agency. The participation variable will be measured by the indicators *to support the ideology of the group* and *the enjoyment for arms/to want military life*. The first answer is linked to moral commitments, or in other words, a contribution to the group goals, in this case, the preservation of the status quo. The second indicator has a subtle tie with the pleasure of participation. Wood (2003) defines participation as pleasurable action; therefore, as long as the *enjoyment for arms/to want military life* is an individual pleasure, the participation in an armed group might be driven by a more "superficial" enjoyment. In other words, they value the opportunity to carry out a military life through the willingness to be involved in PGMs.

On the other hand, *to want vengeance* would be understood as an indicator of defiance because it refers to the quest for justice against the insurgents. Wood explains that, based on the level of indiscriminate violence and terror committed by the state, "it reinforces the cognitive plausibility and moral justifiability of a radical political orientation" (2003, 234). Hence, individuals joining a PGM would perceive their participation as an option to avenge relatives and friends that died due to violence committed by guerrillas or other armed groups. Thus, the vengeance motivation will represent a defiance motivation for people who died to defend the status quo.

The survey will be the main data source used to discuss and test our hypothesis. This data will be complemented with other qualitative sources, such as national reports, judicial sentences, and news from foremost Colombian newspapers. The pleasure of agency dimension is not operationalized, since it is a more ex post reasoning of ex-combatants after their participation of the group. Wood (2003, 239) pointed out that usually pleasure of agency is a reason that is not salient in a prewar position, rather manifesting itself in later stages of the war dynamics or post-war reflections. Here, I use questions to test *participation* and *defiance* that refer to cognitive decisions before they joined the armed groups, so this survey data is not able to capture the post-war reasoning that could also account for the pleasure of agency.

A brief Overview of PGM in Colombia: A Case Study of AUC

The emergence of PGMs in Colombia, commonly known as 'paramilitaries groups', had their outbreak with the intensification of guerilla attacks against the local elites and the promotion of self-defense forces by military and police forces (GMH 2013, 137). PGMs have been accused of carrying out the most brutal repression against civilians in the Colombian armed conflict, including massacres (1,166), selective killings (8,902), tortures (371), kidnappings (2,541), forced disappearance (246) and millions of forced displacement of civilians between 1985-2003 (GMH 2013).

The formation of paramilitary groups[3] emerged because of the intertwining interests of three actors. Firstly, local elites wanted to protect their wealth and political power contested by rebel groups. Secondly, drug traffickers wanted to expand their illegal business and protect their patrimony from the continuous extortion by guerrillas. Finally, the military forces were interested in defeating the guerrillas either through a direct attack against the combatants or attacking civilians accused to be guerrilla supporters (GMH 2013, 142). The conjunction of these different interests promoted the emergence of paramilitary groups in Colombia during the 1980s.

Thus, the first paramilitary wave referred to the inception as self-defense forces which were one of the main pillars of the military counterinsurgency strategy. These groups had access to official arms, munitions, and military training. Likewise, this new military strategy criminalized the left-wing movements and promoted political exclusion to new left-wing parties, such as the emerged Union Patriotica (UP) arisen from the FARC[4] and Government peace agreement in 1985. Paramilitaries assassinated two presidential candidates, eight congressmen, 94 local majors, and thousands of UP members in the conflict-affected regions (GMH 2013, 142).

In the beginning of the 1990s some of the paramilitaries demobilized. However, because of the continuous war against FARC, paramilitaries resurged in 1994 when the government created a new security strategy called Las CONVIVIR with the Decree 356/1994.

The resurgence also entailed the reconfiguration of paramilitaries where the regional militias carried out a meeting with all other militias to create a federative group called the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 1997. They defined themselves as a political-military organization that carry out counterinsurgency operations in order to exercise their right of legitimate defense. At this time, this triggered the most important and largest expansion of paramilitary groups in the whole country, disputing guerrilla strongholds with local elites and military support. In 2002, the new government of Alvaro Uribe Velez promoted peace talks with

[3] Regarding the Colombia case the term 'paramilitary groups' will refer to AUC like PGM as well as paramilitaries.

[4] Main guerrilla group in Colombia.

the paramilitaries that ended in a demobilization of 31,617 members between 2003-2006 in 38 different demobilization events (OACP, 2006).

The characteristics of combatants in AUC were widely mixed. Commanders and middle ranks were mostly people who came from military or privileged life. For instance, Ugarriza and Nussio found in a survey that 34% of AUC ex-combatants assured that they were part of the military forces before joining the group (2015, 201). Gutierrez (2017) has demonstrated that around 73% of the commanders were former cattle ranchers (rural elites) at the moment of demobilization in 2002. These cattle ranchers participated mostly in the creation and funding of paramilitaries rather than engaging in military and leadership functions. About foot soldiers, Arjona and Kalyvas found that they were mostly more educated than guerilla members, had temporary, precarious and sometimes underpaid jobs in pre-war stages and they were "more likely to come from areas where greater state presence exist" (2012, 65).

Findings and Discussion

The survey brings up interesting results. As is shown in Table 2, the three main reasons as to why people decided to join AUC were due to material benefits, with 57.24% of the AUC ex-combatants surveyed. The individuals who joined for participation or defiance reasons were 18.29% of AUC ex-combatants, and 25.18% for other reasons. At first sight, the selective incentive theory has more explanatory power for individuals joining PGMs in Colombia than the pleasure of agency theory.

Table 2. Distributions of main motivations to join AUC.

Answers	Percentage
To want money, land or food	37,17%
To want stable employment	15,68%
To want to get out of the poverty	4,39%
Enjoyment of arms and/or to want a military life	8,43%
To want vengeance	7,60%
Support the ideology of the group	2,26%
Others	25.18%

Source: FIP survey (2018) N=846

H_1 thus seems to be the main explanation for AUC combatant motivations. The selective incentive indicators are seen as the main motivation for 57.24% AUC ex-combatants surveyed. This result also coincides with former studies which have found that material benefits are the most popular reason to join the AUC (Ugarriza and Nussio 2015; Nussio 2010; Arjona and Kalyvas 2012).

There are several mechanisms which can be explained through selective incentive theory. The AUC was largely financed by drug trafficking, which was their main source of funds between 1997-2003 (Cubides 2005). This involvement has been demonstrated in their highly correlated presence in coca crops and their territorial control zones. In fact Echandia (2013) showed this correlation noting that evidence of guerrilla and AUC disputes is relatively low compared with the violence against civilians (homicides and massacres) which is positively correlated with the presence of coca crops zones. Thus, strategic zones with coca crops were continuously fought over by the AUC in order to capture more resources for waging the war.

Due to their involvement in drug trade, some of the middle and high commanders were seen as `pure drug dealers´. In May 2008, 14 commanders were extradited to United States to face trials for drug-trafficking (FIP 2011; Nussio 2010). In Nussio's in-depth interviews, one AUC ex-combatant revealed how salient drug trafficking was: "If one saw the drugs? Sure! To maintain 2,700, the minimum wage was 450,000 [225 US dollars] and the maximum one million [500 US dollars], how would they have done it? Just the weaponry, uniforms, boots, food. There must be drug trade, that's what pays off most" (2010, 1146).

Indeed, this involvement made it possible for the fronts to offer a monthly payment to all their foot soldiers, a benefit that for instance guerrilla groups could not sustain. Gutierrez (2008) has shown that paramilitaries were paying around 200-500 US dollars per month and the Bogotá Criminal Court determined that the Bloque Norte, a AUC front, paid around 600 US dollars to their combatants (Tribunal de Bogotá 2014).

The pleasure of agency indicators account for 18.29% of AUC combatants' motivations, thus being not as common as the selective incentive indicators. This finding would be conditional based on three different factors for the AUC: 1) individual motivations to join armed groups might change over time depending on the conflict phase; 2) there might be different motivations according to low-, middle- or high-rank soldiers; and 3) some limitations in regard to the data used to test the hypothesis.

First of all, the war would have continuously created different motivations to join paramilitary groups over time. During the rise of paramilitary groups (1980-1985) several rural elites promoted ideas that guerillas and left-wing movements would continuously expel rural elites in order to appropriate their lands. For instance, in Puerto Boyacá Magdalena region, rural elites created Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del Magdalena Medio (ACDEGAM) as a paramilitary group to offer security and protect land properties from guerrilla attacks and extortions. This armed organization mobilized local communities and provided them with arms and military training to be able to protect their goods and land (Ronderos 2014). ACDEGAM would have eased the participation of individuals for pleasure of agency reasons given that communities in Puerto Boyacá were continuously weighed down by guerrillas and they desperately needed security in order to not lose their goods. As soon as the armed conflict changed in Colombia, paramilitaries increased their involvement in drug trafficking, using less ideological propaganda and increasing resources so as to create more selective incentives for participation in their groups. Thus, the war dynamics and organization structure shifted. This can also account for why we have more individuals who joined paramilitaries for material benefits when they were militarily stronger (1997-2003).

Second, the differences in motivation might also be accounted for by type of rank within the organization. Most of the authors and research in Colombia on paramilitary groups used foot soldiers' data in order to identify motivations. Foot soldiers could be more interested in finding a stable wage in the group whilst mid-ranks and high commanders would have joined the groups more for pleasure of agency reasons such as the fairness of the ideology. According to Nussio (2010), few demobilized individuals showed motivations to support the AUC ideology; but those who did were mid-ranking combatants: "I'm proud that I participated in the AUC. […] I'm a "paraco" [paramilitary] since before I was born. And I would go back again" (Nussio 2010, 106).

However, this idea is not completely sustained by the survey's answers when it is sorted by level of rank. From the 65 high and mid-ranked commanders, 27% joined due to pleasure of agency motivations, 45% joined for material benefits, and 19% for other reasons. The share of the reasons

for pleasure of agency is almost equal compared to the general sample of the AUC. Therefore, the argument that individuals in higher ranks might have joined for pleasure of agency rather than selective incentives does not hold based on the survey data. However, I cannot draw a definitive conclusion from the survey since the sampling process did not result in a representative sample by level of rank.

Finally, the data selected to answer H_2 is limited in terms of richness that it provides. Wood (2003) used mainly ethnographic techniques to capture and construct her theory of pleasure of agency, therefore, the amount of detailed data is more abundant in Wood's (2003) study than in the closed-ended questions used here. This limitation is important to stress because I am not able to analyze the in-depth cognitive process that some AUC ex-combatants went through in order to make their own decisions whether to join the paramilitary groups. It is important to state that the analysis was focused on two main theories and I did not attempt to test the explanatory power of other theories (i.e. social networks or sensation seeking).

Conclusion

This paper attempted to answer why individuals decide to participate in PGMs in Colombia based on two relevant theories: selective incentive and pleasure of agency theories. The question is relevant for the theoretical discussion since recruitment theories have not been tested to understand further individual decisions to join PGMs.

Based on these two theories I formulated two hypotheses. The first considers that the individual decision to join PGMs is based on material incentives offered by the militias. The second hypothesis posits that individuals will be more likely to join militias if they perceived that their participation is a contribution to the fairness and righteousness to protect the status quo.

To test the hypotheses, I used a survey from FIP (2008) which asked AUC ex-combatants why they decided to participate in militias. Based on 846 observations, I operationalized the independent variables (material benefits, defiance, and participation) with six different indicators, three for each theory. Afterwards, I tested the explanatory power of both theories, drawing on this data as well as on other qualitative sources to supplement alternative accounts and overcome research limitations based on the survey.

The findings demonstrated that the selective incentive theory has more explanatory power than the pleasure of agency theory. More than half of the AUC ex-combatants joined the group because they wanted land, money or food; they were looking for stable employment or they wanted to get out of poverty. This is also supported by other studies that have evidence of material benefit motivations (Ugarriza and Nussio 2015; Nussio 2010; Echandia 2013; Cubides 2005; Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012). However, despite the theory, agency did not have enough support in the survey data; other sources have shown that AUC members also joined for the pleasure of the military life and to pursue the AUC ideology. In the discussion section, I stated that the pleasure of agency has a slight explanatory power for roughly 18% of AUC members. Although it is not a common motivation, I identify three different factors which could help in understanding the lack of support for the hypothesis: the variety of recruitment strategies carried out by AUC over time (Ronderos 2014), the role of rank in shaping motivations (Nussio 2010), and data limitations.

I would like to also point out that 33.63% of combatants are motivated by neither material benefits nor pleasure of agency reasons. As such, individual decisions are complex decision-making processes. Scholars should understand that the decision to join a militia as well as a rebel group is not based on a single motivation; decision-making processes are based on multiple motivations

such as social networks, non-participation costs and sensation seeking. Then, other motivations could also speak out to other theories that were not tested, leaving a future research motivation to reach a more comprehensible analysis of the recruitment strategies.

Finally, this paper attempted to perform an extension of the classical theories of rebel recruitment. This research did not have the objective to demonstrate differences between rebel and militia groups. However, it demonstrated some basic discussions that can be useful in future studies to understand the variance of motivations among non-state armed actors. For instance, scholars have tried to answer whether militias and rebel groups are more greed-oriented rather than grievance-oriented (Ugarriza and Nussio 2015; Gutiérrez Sanín 2008; Sanín and Wood 2014). Therefore, comparative studies and large-N studies among rebel groups and militias would be useful to develop more comprehensive theories of non-state armed group recruitment in peace and conflict research.

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Assessing the Effectiveness of European Union Conflict Management in the Extended Neighborhood: The Case of Chad and the Central African Republic

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Author Biography

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Abstract

This article critically analyzes the efficacy of European level conflict management practices in the extended neighborhood. Using the example of the European Union Force in Chad and the Central African Republic CAR (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), it examines the extent to which the militarization of European foreign policy has affected the process of conflict management. In particular, it focuses on the role individual nation states play in shaping and manipulating European structures to achieve their own foreign policy goals. By utilizing a set of synthesized analytical methods, this paper concludes that an overly militarized European level defense policy bureaucracy, driven by individual nation state's interests, has been largely ineffective in shaping positive conflict management outcomes.

Introduction

In 2008, thousands of European Union (EU) troops were deployed to both Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), ostensibly in response to the spillover of violence occurring in neighboring Sudan. Strikingly, the majority of these soldiers were French and many had likely been deployed to the region before. Both states have been pejoratively referred to as a "French aircraft carrier in the desert" by humanitarian non-governmental organizations (Human Rights Watch 2016, 3). Nonetheless, the operation bore the flag of the EU and was authorized by both a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and European Council mandate. EUFOR Tchad/RCA was the largest EU military mission of its kind at the time and represented a shift to a more militarized form of EU foreign policy. The operation had no civilian contingent and the command structure remained almost entirely within the mandate of uniformed personnel. The operation then is an optimal case study for exploring the EU's use of military force in conflict management, particularly in regard to the role national governments play in generating and shaping the mission.

The conflict in Central Africa, what some researchers have referred to as a 'regional conflict system' (Kuehne 2009; Mattelaer 2008; Hainzl and Feichtinger 2011), is a series of mutually reinforcing crises in Sudan (and now also South Sudan), Chad, the CAR, Nigeria, Mali, and Libya. The conflict is highly reflective of the 'new wars' concept described by Mary Kaldor (2012), with a multitude of actors including national governments, international organizations, peacekeeping troops, rebel groups, and privatized military forces. These political and ethnic conflicts have only been compounded by severe public health and environmental disasters. Indeed, Lamine Cisse, a

former official with the United Nations (UN) in the CAR is quoted saying, "The conflicts are all linked, and solving one requires solving all" (Hanson 2006).

This article will assess the effectiveness of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) utilizing the Heider, Kleine, and Peters (2004) and Thomas (2012) frameworks for categorizing and measuring effectiveness in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and focusing on the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The analysis is an offshoot of the EUNPACK project, with the goal of unpacking EU crisis response practices in order to increase knowledge of these functions and how they can be improved. It will seek to answer the following three questions: RQ 1) What was EUFOR Tchad/RCA? RQ 2) How effective was the mission? RQ 3) What factors influenced the mission's effectiveness? EUFOR Tchad/RCA is a useful historical mission for study, as it shows many of the problems endemic to CFSP and CSDP prior to the Lisbon Treaty and it also shows issues that have persisted despite Lisbon's institutional reforms. Furthermore, it is an excellent descriptive example of the mechanism by which member states' preferences undermine cohesion, which in turn harms both bureaucratic and material effectiveness. The article will begin with a review of the theoretical literature that has attempted to conceptualize EU foreign and security policy, followed by a description of the method of analysis to be used to both improve upon previous theoretical conceptualizations and guide the assessment of the individual operation in a constructive manner. Following this method, the operation itself will be explored, from its first proposal to pre-deployment planning, to the implementation in Chad and the CAR, and to its post-deployment impact.

Theoretical Background

In judging the effectiveness of foreign policy it is useful to examine the different conceptualizations of what that foreign policy identity is supposed to be. Generally, in the case of democracies but more specifically in the European case, this is especially necessary as there are various struggles to develop a vision of the role of foreign and military policy while also remaining conscious of core democratic principles. This has been especially prevalent in the development of the CSDP, as this diverged from earlier ideas of EU-level global engagement. An early scholarly contest was carried out between the ideas of Francois Duchene, Hedley Bull, and Ian Manners. Central to this debate are competing concepts of military, civilian, and normative power. Peters highlights these questions directly, asking "what kind of actor/power the EU is?" (Peters 2016a, 2).

Duchene was one of the 'founding fathers' of the new European power debate, creating the line of thought that would become associated with "civilian power Europe" (CPE). Typical of the idealist streak within European academics and political leaders in the 1960s and 1970s, this concept is an idea of Europe that is closely related to 'pluralist' theories of international relations, emphasizing non-state actors, economic interdependence, and ideational factors in conceptualizing European power. Essentially, the concept implies that Europe is and should be reflective of a trading state rather than a military power. The argument distinctly eschewed the notion of Europe as a major military power, one that should avoid rather than pursue capabilities to project force into the world (Orbie 2006, 123-125). Hanns Maull (1990, 92-93) builds upon this describing civilian power (specifically in the German case) as being characterized by an emphasis on cooperation in international matters, the prioritization of economic means in the pursuit of national goals, and the willingness to develop supranational structures to address international management issues.

Bull (1982, 151-152) responded with a heavily critical description of civilian power as a "contradiction in terms". Based in the more realist strain of international relations scholarship, Bull wrote that Europe should avoid the CPE concept and embrace more self-sufficient defense politics designed to enhance the role of Europe in the world. Highlighting the divergence of interests vis-à-vis the United States, the continuing threat of the Soviet Union, and also strengthening the "regeneration of Europe" in that providing for one's own security is of the highest importance of any state (or community of states), Bull argued that a "[Western European] alliance within an alliance, preserving the wider structure of NATO," should be formed (Bull 1982, 164). Interestingly, Bull never considered this position feasible, at best being a remote proposition for a far-off future. The argument also did not move towards developing increased competencies in a supranational form, instead adding a military dimension to Bull's realist view of Europe as a concert of states. This position, described as 'military Europe', became especially prevalent following the demonstrated lack of capabilities of European armed forces in the multinational interventions in the Balkans (Howorth, 2014, 6).

After the EU began to develop a CSDP due to failures in the Balkans (especially as the United States took the lead role in the Kosovo intervention), scholars began to comment upon the real possibilities of a more militarized European foreign policy. Ian Manners (2006, 188-193) was critical of these developments, establishing a type of third way scholarship that generated the 'normative Europe' concept. Neither militarized or formally diplomatic, and lying between the dichotomous relationship of civilian and military power, Manners (2006) presents normative power as an alternative similar to Joseph Nye's 'soft power' concept (2005, 6). In it, the EU as a power uses its ideological foundations as a foreign policy tool, thereby being able to shape the conceptions of what is 'normal' (Manners 2002, 239). Writing that the EU is a system that transcends Westphalian norms of governance or state conception, Manners (2002) examines methods by which the norms of the EU treaties are diffused to both member states and non-member states. In terms of the extended neighborhood, the most applicable method would be overt diffusion, involving the physical presence of the EU in third countries, through the establishment of monitoring missions, commission delegates, and member state embassies. What is crucial in this concept is that it is not instrumental but rather an organic process of diffusion that does not involve imposed reforms or military involvement (Manners 2002, 245).

In Peters' (2016b) conclusions on these different conceptualizations, each of the three versions shows distinct weaknesses. By trying to define Europe's actorness or power in any distinct way, it ignores the fact the Europe is not *sui generis* in its foreign policy behavior and is actually quite reflective of the same challenges that many nation-states and international organizations face. Indeed, Peters (2016a) highlights the analytical ineffectiveness in attempting to conceive of European foreign policy in one way or another. Put simply, the EU embodies each of these possible visions at different times and situations, as any other foreign policy actor would. It is suggested then, that the analysis focuses not on attempting to describe Europe's foreign policy identity, but rather the relationship between Member State preferences, the Union's policy bureaucracy, and material political outcomes, in order to judge the more policy relevant issues of coherence and effectiveness; this can in turn lead to a qualification of Europe's actorness and power (Peters 2016b, 277-278).

By eschewing EU identity debates, an opening is left for other theoretical explanations. Of direct relevance to this analysis is the role that neocolonial hegemony plays in shaping and maintaining member state preferences towards former colonies. Sepos (2013) has conceptually

divided imperialism, neocolonialism, and hegemony in order to better differentiate concepts that imply varying levels of coercion. In the first two concepts, overt coercion is practiced via economic and military force to control governance in a region directly. Hegemony, however, is practiced with a measure of consent from the local government and the hegemonic state acts as a leader rather than a dominator (Sepos 2013, 263-268). This idea of hegemony is more useful than a pure neo-imperial lens. As it will be discussed later, there is a symbiotic relationship between the former colonizer (France) and the local government (Chad and CAR) as the former colonizer acts as a security guarantor, while also being able to ensure its ability to project physical and economic power in its former holdings. It is this context that places the idea of neocolonial hegemony as a central explanatory theory in the story of EU military involvement in Africa, as France's pre-established hegemony in the region has deep impacts on the ability of EU missions to coherently and effectively reach their goals. Indeed, Francois-Xavier Verschave went so far to coin the term *Francafrique* to describe the unique relationship between local powers in African states and the French government (Verschave 2006).

This article makes its contribution by merging what scholars have largely done separately. While Member State Preferences (Berg 2009), policy machinery (Mattelaer 2008), political outcomes (Howorth 2014), and the role of neo-imperialism (Sepos 2013) have all been explored separately, this analysis will analyze the convergence of these factors and their effects on two metrics that can adequately be used to explore EU foreign policy: cohesiveness and effectiveness. In this case in particular, EUFOR Tchad/RCA has been chosen as it strongly describes the *mechanism by which cohesiveness precedes effectiveness*, while also highlighting issues common to EU foreign policy making writ large.

Turning then to the method of investigation, the following section will explain the process by which these relationships will be explored, and how this can address the three questions introduced earlier to generate a meaningful hypothesis for future research: RQ 1) What was EUFOR Tchad/RCA? RQ 2) How effective was the mission? RQ 3) What factors influenced the mission's effectiveness?

Method of Investigation

Therefore, by focusing this analysis on outcome-based and policy relevant questions, analytical methods must be chosen that can judge the relationship between Member State preferences, the machinery of EU policy-making, and political outcomes. As mentioned before, the goal of this paper is to analyze coherence and effectiveness rather than theoretical foreign policy identities. This raises the question of how to analyze the concepts of coherence and effectiveness. It is necessary to identify concrete indicators by which to measure effectiveness, rather than postulate vaguely about outcome effectiveness. By using indicators across the policy-making process, a clearer understanding of effectiveness can be reached. The method of this article will draw upon Daniel Thomas' (2012) conceptualization of coherence, and Peters' et. al. (2004) framework for analyzing effectiveness.

Thomas' (2012) definition of policy coherence builds on the relationship between policy determinacy and political cohesion. Determinacy is defined by Thomas (2012, 459) as "how clearly a policy adopted articulates the Union's goals, and how narrowly it specifies the behaviors incumbent on Member States in order to achieve those goals". For example, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1778 (subsequently supported by a Council Joint Resolution) established the mandate for EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The resolution established a fairly

narrow and constraining mandate, limited in spatial, temporal, and mission scope. In Thomas' (2012) terminology, the mandate would be said to have had a high-level of policy determinacy, as it very narrowly defines the roles of Member States and the overall mission. The second element, political cohesion, is defined as a reflection of how fully EU Member States support whatever common policy has been agreed. This is a particularly easy exercise in CSDP military missions, as the material contributions of states can easily be used as a determinant of a state's level of commitment to the common policy. Most importantly in Thomas' (2012) concept of coherence is the *relationship between* the two concepts. In general, coherency is highest when both policy determinacy and political cohesion is high (see Figure 1), though a challenge is noted that on occasion it has been the case that high levels of determinacy actually *decrease* political cohesion, thus damaging overall coherency (Thomas 2012, 458-460).



Figure 1: *(Source: Thomas 2012, 460)*

For the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, both determinacy and cohesion must be examined. In terms of policy determinacy, the textual details of the UNSCR establishing its mandate and the subsequent EU-level documents establishing more nuanced details will be investigated to ascertain what level of policy determinacy was present at the earliest stages. Political cohesion will be seen through the material contributions states make to the implementation of the operation. The yardsticks of determinacy then will be what exact language is used to establish roles in the mandate, and for cohesion it will be the contributions of men and materiel to the mission. Examining the case will also prove a useful exercise in exploring the actual relationship between determinacy and cohesion in affecting coherence.

In terms of effectiveness, a more complex model will be used in order to better trace effectiveness across the policy process, from input to impact. Heider, Kleine, and Peters (2004) developed a model for categorizing CFSP effectiveness by adapting a model used for environmental reform (see Figure 2). In it, the line of Input-Decision Making-Output-Outcome-Impact are translated into effectiveness indicators that can be used as concrete measures to make unqualified statements regarding effectiveness. In addition to the effectiveness indicators listed below under outcome-effectiveness, this article will also discuss the efficient deployment by internal actors (i.e. the speed to which the policy is actually implemented) and the availability of capabilities to fulfill the stated policy (Heide et. al. 2004).



Figure 2: *(Source: Heider, Kleine and Peters 2004)*

Firstly, the agenda setting process will be addressed as it comes to responding to the wider regional crisis in the Darfur region. This will heavily affect the judgement of output effectiveness, as it applies to how well this output actually applies to the occurring crisis. Under output effectiveness, the indicators can be identified by tracing the process of policy formulation through the member states foreign ministries, into the EU-level processes, and into the outcome documents such as joint resolutions. Outcome effectiveness can be best identified through the coordination of the deployment to the theater of operations, and how well the operation performed during its time in theater. In particular, the ability of the EU forces to overcome logistical deployment issues will be addressed. Finally, the impact effectiveness can best be determined by on the ground results achieved in reducing violence and in protecting refugees. In both the agenda setting and impact assessments, conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP) will be used to examine the quality of the EU policy-making process and the overall impact on the combat-related and one-sided deaths incurred by the local population.

As the method of investigation has been established, the article will now turn towards applying this method to the case, dividing the analysis between three separate stages of the operation and providing, at the end of each stage, an analytical assessment of stages effectiveness. The conclusions that follow will then synthesize these finding into an overall assessment for the mission to Chad and the CAR.

EUFOR Tchad/CAR: Generation, Implementation, and Impact

It would be excessive to begin an overview of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation by addressing Europe's long-standing interventionist attitude towards states across the African continent. However, it should be briefly noted that the EU policy towards African states is in large part driven by Member States preferences towards their own former colonies. France and the United Kingdom are perhaps the best examples, though it is France that has continued to maintain large standing forces in Western and Central African states following the period of decolonization after 1945. Early examples of this dynamic appear in some of the first development aid agreements written in the 1960s and 1970s. The Yaouendé Convention of 1963 and the Lomé Convention of 1976 explicitly referred to preferential treatment by the European Economic Community (EEC) of

former European colonies, noted by Gruhn as having a distinct goal of maintaining influence in the French case (Gruhn 1976, 246). Indeed, the French made the preferential treatment of French territories a prerequisite for joining the EEC in 1957 (European Community Information Service 1966, 1). At the time, Ghanaian president Nkrumah called EEC involvement in Africa "collective colonialism" (Gruhn 1976, 244).

Nearly every involvement of European troops on the continent of Africa has felt the element of neocolonial sentiment. Whether the involvement of Belgian peacekeepers in the UN mission to Rwanda or the unilateral intervention of the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, the policy preferences for using troops in Africa maintains a consistent pattern. The strongest example of this is France. While most other EU Member States join occasional peacekeeping or intervention forces in former colonies, France maintains a sizable military presence in many, perhaps more prevalently in Chad and the CAR. France has continually supported the governments of both states despite clear anti-democratic governance; both have been described as 'not free' by the Freedom House Index since the inception of its measurement criteria in 1999 (Freedom House 1999-2018). This is indicative of neocolonial hegemonic theory, in that France exerts its influence with the consent of local governments and ensures its historical ability to project power in the region in the process.

French troops had been based permanently in the capital of Chad, N'Djamena, since the beginning of Operation Epervier in 1986, an operation that supported then Chadian president Hissèné Habré against the movement of rebels from Libya into Chad (Bender 2015). The presence had waxed and waned over the years, though an increase occurred as the Sudan-backed United Front for Democratic Change (UFDC) rebels launched an assault on N'Djamena in early 2006. Fearing for the survival of their preferred leader, now Idriss Deby, French forces increased their logistical and air support for the regime and contributed to the defeat of rebels shortly after their intervention (Pleming 2006). The battle, part of a wider conflict between Chad and Sudan, was preceded by the signing of the Tripoli peace agreement between N'Djamena and Khartoum, leading to a freezing of relations and an increase of violence across the country (McDoom 2006) as rebel groups and the government reinvigorated their efforts to seize control (see Figure 3). During all of this, the conflict in Darfur had hit a high point in terms of civilian targeting by Sudanese forces and Janjaweed militias, leading many to declare Sudanese behavior as encompassing war crimes and even genocide. Refugees streamed across the borders of Chad and the CAR (which had acted as a base for some anti-Deby rebel groups), exacerbating an already complex region wide conflict system.



Figure 3: *Chart showing the outbreak of violence in Chad beginning in early 2006, beginning with the Battle of N'Djamena. Note, no chart on the Central African Republic has been provided as no violence had broken out. (Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2018)*

Agenda Setting and Policy Formulation

In response to this spiraling conflict system, the French government began to push both the UN and the EU for a solution. Its material interests in Central Africa now threatened by the conflict, Paris dispatched foreign minister Bernard Kouchner across European capitals with a vague proposal to develop an international response to the crisis. Critically, Kouchner was also sent to N'Djamena, and obtained from president Deby himself the Chadian (and the CAR's) conditions for the deployment of the force (Dijkstra 2010, 3-4). The agenda and the majority of terms then, were set by Paris and N'Djamena before any negotiations occurred at either the UNSC or in the European Council of Ministers.

Paris' first victory came with the passing of UNSCR 1778, which mandated the presence of a 12-month 'bridging force' to precede the deployment of a United Nations presence that would come to be called the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) (UNSC 2007). Tellingly, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations opposed the deployment of a mission to Central Africa at that time, arguing that conditions were not correct for a military force to deploy. The inclusion of the EU as the initial military element of an intervention was a key part of Deby's terms, who opposed the broader deployment of a UN force that would include requirements for democratic reform or a power sharing agreement (Ki-Moon 2007, 1). The text of the UN mandate authorized the EU force:

> "(i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
> (ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;
> (iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel" (UNSC 2007, 4)

What the mandate did not include were the terms agreed to between Kouchner and Deby that barred international forces from deploying or patrolling near the border area (where the highest level of refugees and internally displaced persons were) and that both refugee and internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps were to be maintained and governed by Chadian gendarmes rather than EUFOR troops. Berg (2009, 61) has referred to this second level of terms as a "shadow

mandate" through which France maneuvered the multilateral operation towards its own national interests.

After the vote on UNSCR 1778 (a unanimous vote), the council generated its own authorization document, Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP, to establish the EU-level instruments that would support the military operation. As neither the European External Action Service or the High Representative or Vice-President position had been created yet, the political and strategic direction (and also highest-level authority) of the mission was placed with the Council's Political and Security Committee (PSC). Furthermore, the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Sudan had its mandate expanded to include an advisory role on the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation. Operational control was established at the French military facility at Mount Valerien outside of Paris, commanded by Irish general Patrick Nash, reporting directly to the EU Military Committee. Command on the ground at N'Djamena was given to French general Jean-Phillipe Ganascia. In two other important details, the mission was authorized to seek third country support and that the mission would terminate exactly twelve months after reaching Initial Operating Capacity, a descriptor carefully chosen to avoid a premature withdrawal (Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP).

There is much to comment upon in terms of policy determinacy and output effectiveness in both UNSCR 1778 and Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP. Turning first to policy determinacy, both documents address the goals of both organizations directly (being the same in this case, the Joint Action refers its goals to the UNSCR 1778). However, they cannot be taken to mean a high-level of determinacy as the terms of the agreement between Kouchner and Deby were not stated in any UN or EU-level policy document, and only became apparent in the implementation stage. Those terms along with the limited general mandate and lack of on the ground political control (in the form of a strengthened EUSR), set up a situation where the output effectiveness can only be described as limited. Importantly, by excluding any diplomatic or economic element the mission gave up the possibilities of a comprehensive approach. Also, importantly, as can be seen in the conflict data presented earlier, the overall rate of violence had decreased by the time the negotiations over the resolutions and joint actions were concluded, highlighting a serious delay in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the characteristics that led to such low policy determinacy, namely the readily apparent French interest and influence of the operation, led to a lowered level of political cohesion as will be seen in the next section with the opt-outs of the operation taken by Germany and the United Kingdom.

Policy Implementation

EUFOR Tchad/RCA experienced implementation issues almost immediately. Lack of buy-in, a very slow strategic planning process, and a host of logistical problems led to a delayed deployment that relied on third-country airlift capacities and did not include the other two largest EU Member States, Germany and the United Kingdom. In terms of implementation, it seems the EUFOR mission was more a demonstration of a lack of EU cohesion and capabilities than anything else.

Firstly, the composition of the mission made achieving effectiveness difficult. Neither the United Kingdom nor Germany were particularly interested in becoming involved in another French-led Africa intervention, with Berlin in particular feeling it had 'paid its African dues' by participating in the 2006 mission EUFOR RD Congo (Howorth, 2014, 160). Meanwhile London was facing foreign policy problems elsewhere, as its deepening involvement in the Iraq war left its hands tied to respond to events in other regions (Howorth 2014, 160). The loss of the United Kingdom as a partner was a significant blow, due to its high-level of readiness and logistical

prowess, and its recently successful intervention in Sierra Leone in 2003. Deprived of the material capabilities of the United Kingdom and the political cohesion of Germany, the EUFOR mission was predominantly French, with 2,000 of the eventually deployed 3,700 troops being from French units that had only recently rotated out of Operation Epervier, the permanent French garrison in Chad. EUFOR Tchad/RCA shows in this stage partial support for Thomas' (2012) argument that low policy determinacy affects political cohesion and thus coherence, particularly in the case of the German opt-out. Though many other states did contribute, including then EU-applicant Croatia and Albania, with the second and third largest contingents being from neutral Ireland and newly admitted Poland, the heavy lifting of the operation ultimately fell to the French (Howorth, 160-161).

Secondly, the length of the strategic level planning process following policy formulation was extremely sluggish. Shown by Mattelaer (2008), the point of Initial Operational Capability that would start the official beginning of the mission did not begin until almost a full year after the French began lobbying for deployment. The mission did not reach full operation capacity until September 2008, well over two years after the first outbreak of violence that spurred the international response. 'Force generation', the process by which the mission actually identifies units and makes them operational, took months of negotiations and five intergovernmental conferences. Described by a commentator as a "game of poker", France and the other Member States sought to balance involvement in a meaningful way (Mattelaer, 2008, 24). France, though the architect of the mission, attempted to reduce its level of troop commitment given its ongoing presence in other EUFOR operations and in its NATO contributions to Afghanistan. Other states meanwhile, wanted to keep the burden on France out of the continuing suspicion that the mission would first and foremost only serve the national interest of France (Mattelaer 2008). This long-delayed process essentially made the mission irrelevant by the point of its full operational capacity, as conflict data shows that by late 2008 the level of violence had significantly been reduced and would only continue to decrease.

Finally, the logistical shortfalls of the European forces were only rescued by the involvement of third party states. Though provided for in the Joint Action, this was hardly desirable as it was an international demonstration of a lack of capacity. Russia and Ukraine ultimately provided nearly all of the airlift capacities of the mission (Marchal 2011, 27), another blow that had been construed by some participating Member States, namely Ireland, as an opportunity to demonstrate effective European capabilities in the face of a crisis. Furthermore, there was a broader issue of EU-Russia security cooperation during the same period during which Russia invaded Georgia, causing a spillover into effective foreign policymaking in another region.

Applying method to the case, it is difficult to say that EUFOR Tchad/RCA was effectively implemented. By following the previously listed yardsticks of coordinated policy compliance, efficient deployment, and being able to generate necessary capabilities, EUFOR fell short. Due to the lack of political cohesion with the United Kingdom and Germany, the EU suffered from a strong perception of not being impartial (which is borne out to be true in light of how the operation was generated), making internal compliance with the policy very weak. Secondly, the policy was implemented so slowly due to the strategic planning process at the military implementation level, the crisis had nearly passed the mission by. Though persistent issues of crime and food security continued, the deployment of a military force was hardly the correct tool by the time of its full operational capability being reached. Finally, the logistical shortfalls of the EU were laid out to the

international community as it relied almost solely on third-country participation to deploy in support of its own mission.

Policy Results and Impact

Noted separately by Howorth and Marchal, assessing the impact and results of EUFOR Tchad/RCA is entirely dependent on how narrow the analysis is (Howorth 2014; Marchal 2011). Most analysts who have celebrated the mission as a success have focused on the narrow accomplishments achieved within the EU mandate. Others, particularly NGOs, criticize this narrowness and highlight the limited scope and mandate of the mission. This analysis will recognize both the achievements and shortfalls of the operation, though the overall outlook for the success of EUFOR Tchad/RCA is that it failed to address the deeper issues at hand in the region, ultimately having had little impact. Interestingly, conceptions of success also tend to vary between Member States.

The effectiveness indicators identified by Heider et. al. (2004) provides a useful guide, though 'change of behavior' on behalf of the target state is less applicable, as the mission did not directly address the behavior of an individual state. Choosing instead the resolution of the underlying problems as a yardstick, it must first be reiterated what problems were to be solved. First, there was the general violence against civilians (in Chad and the CAR), particularly refugees and IDPs per the mandate provided by UNSCR 1778. Second, the need for a broader addressing of the regional conflict system that had engendered the need for intervention, especially through some form of diplomatic resolution.

The first indicator requires both a quantitative measure along with qualitative support. "Contributing to the protection of civilians in danger" (UNSC, 2007, 4) leaves a certain level of vagueness to debate the effectiveness of EUFOR. Turning again to the conflict data, the following charts from the UCDP provide some interesting insights. The first, covering the conflict period in Chad, shows that the dynamics of the fighting had already begun to slow down before the arrival of European troops, with the last significant spike in violence occurring two months prior to their initial arrival (Uppsala Conflict Data Program). Perhaps just as interesting, the majority of violence was state-based, which the UCDP Conflict Data defines as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state" (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Meaning, the violence that *did* occur during EUFOR's deployment was between the Chadian government and rebel groups, rather than the direct targeting of civilians that spurred the mandate. Most tellingly, the last recorded instance of cross-border violence against civilians perpetrated by Sudanese backed Janjaweed militias occurred a full year before the deployment of EUFOR.



Figure 4: *Chad (Source: Uppsala Conflict Database Program 2018)*



Figure 5: *Central African Republic (Source: Uppsala Conflict Database Program 2018)*

For the second geographical focus of the mission, the CAR, there were no cross-border strikes on civilian targets by militias in 2008, and the last ones to occur were in early 2007, approximately the point in time the French foreign ministry began pushing the mission. Important in assessing the impact, the mission did little to guard long-lasting security, as a large spike in violence can be seen beginning in early 2013.

These quantitative indicators are not enough however. As the German Center for International Peace Operations (ZiF), British Oxfam, and the International Crisis Group have reported in interviews with refugees, the presence of European troops did provide a much-needed sense of security for the refugees and IDPs, an integral part of the post-conflict recovery process (Kuehne 2009, Oxfam 2008, Howorth 2014). In a particular incident in Kerfi in July 2008, civilians praised both the impartiality and professionalism of EUFOR troops in mediating fighting between government troops and rebels (Oxfam 2008, 13). However, ZiF has also noted that this sentiment was largely limited to the areas that EUFOR troops were able to be present in, and that troops were not able to make security improvements to either the border area or within refugee camps (Kuehne 2009, 30-31).

For the second indicator, establishing a broader political solution to the regional crisis, the analysis must return to the establishment of the mandate. This assessment is strikingly similar to Manners' analysis of Operation Artemis in 2003, another European military mission to Africa, this time in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Manners wrote of the mission, "It was probably the case that [French Foreign Minister] Alliot-Marie could have announced the mission successful prior to its deployment given the limited mandate that was bound to succeed" (Manners 2006, 190). With the mandate being designed based off of its possibility of success, rather than its

practical ability to resolve the problem in Central Africa, the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission reflects Artemis in that it is difficult to see how it could have failed given its limited scope. By not placing the EU Special Representative for Sudan within the chain of command, and by depriving that position of a political mandate in either Chad or the CAR, a diplomatic solution to the Chad-Sudan conflict that also involved cross-border strikes into the CAR was almost impossible. Furthermore, this lack of a senior political coordinator locally meant that all strategic and political decisions were made in Brussels within the Political and Security Committee of the Council, while also robbing the mission of a "genuine European character" (Berg 2009, 69). Korski and Gowan (2009, 14-15) have highlighted the dangers of micromanagement from Brussels, as mission bureaucrats focus too much on trivial matters rather than developing a coherent strategic plan. This was especially prevalent in the strategic planning phase of implementation, as the sluggish process at the EU-level led to the mission deploying far too late to take full advantage of its possible value-add.

Naturally, official sources have referred to the mission as a success, though not consistently. The former operational commander has strongly defended the mission against charges of overbearing French influence, stating in an interview with the Irish Times that he saw the mission as "a major projection of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)" (Marlowe 2009). This is an interesting departure from the French and EU official statements regarding the success of the mission, with the French Ministry of Defense highlighting the successes of the logistical deployment in light of the geographical difficulties (Ministere De Armees 2010). The EU in a third strain highlights the limited achievement of the goals stated in the mandate, largely in defiance of the readily apparent facts (EEAS 2009).

Conclusion

The aim of this article was to answer three questions: 1) What was EUFOR Tchad/RCA? 2) How effective was the mission? 3) What factors influenced the mission's effectiveness? By proceeding through a careful analysis across the policy-making process, these three questions have been answered, and have been sufficient to generate a hypothesis. The hypothesis then is that *EU foreign policy coherence and effectiveness is degraded if the influence of a single Member State with national interest in a crisis grows*. From behind the scenes negotiations between Deby and Kouchner, to the refusal of Germany and the United Kingdom to participate, the fundamentals of the operation were undermined by the overwhelming French influence in the mission. EUFOR Tchad/RCA also fully reflected Hedley Bull's view of European foreign policy, being an entirely military force without any civilian component to negotiate a region-wide solution to endemic problems.

Other factors certainly affected the impact of the mission. Nearly all European forces had been overstretched, with the United Kingdom in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Germany in Afghanistan, and France across both theaters plus several African operations. It was perhaps in some ways predetermined that EUFOR Tchad/RCA was a bridge too far in terms of building both a coherent and effective force. This could have contributed to the materiel shortfalls and lack of manpower from some of the other participating states. However, what this analysis has shown is that the one, unifying factor that affected the outcome of the mission was the French influence. It is almost ironic that what was in the end a French foreign policy failure just as much as an EU one, was ultimately caused by Europe's own past in colonizing the African continent.

This article has also demonstrated the robustness of Thomas' (2012) method for analyzing coherency and utilizing Heide, Kleine, and Peters' (2004) framework for categorizing effectiveness. Rather than utilizing a more basic policy cycle analysis, these methods were better suited to cover

the entire policy process. The paper also deliberately avoided the EU's crisis response cycle method, as the conflict data clearly does not cover when the Union becomes involved in the addressing of a crisis, in this case arriving far too late. The chosen method then was proven a strong analytical framework, one that could easily be applied to other military missions. The addition of military specific effectiveness indicators allows for this, as it improves the ability of the method to analyze defense affairs.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA is also a useful case in demonstrating the theoretical power of neocolonial hegemony. As seen in the planning stage, the French and Chadian governments purposefully designed the parameters of the international mission in such a way that it would mutually benefit their respective governments, to the exclusion of EU mission effectiveness. The French government proved its willingness to work with questionably democratic states in order to ensure its power projection within the region, while local leadership was willing to ally itself with the former colonial power in order to ensure the survival of their government. The role of local consent is key in the hegemonic dynamic, and it is clearly seen in the development of the 'shadow mandate' developed by the Deby regime that prevented EUFOR troops from policing the border with Sudan. This dynamic is the operative mechanism at play in determining policy effectiveness in the region, as all efforts not sanctioned by these two states may exist on paper, but face little possibility of implementation if they would alter the nature of the relationship between the hegemon and the local dependent.

What can be seen in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA is that the EU faces structural issues that have yet to be rectified by treaty reforms or institutional innovation, and continues to wrestle with the challenges that any foreign policy actor must address when formulating and implementing foreign policy. There is little to show for the EU's (or France's, for that matter) investment in military operations in Chad and the CAR, with each continuing down a path of oppressive governance and spiraling civil conflict, respectively. Violence has been especially brutal in the CAR, with several other EU and French led missions having intervened in attempts to quell the spread of killings. Also in the CAR case, the failure of EU policy in the region has played a role in opening a vacuum into which Russian influence has taken hold, in an East-West conflict era style development.

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Western Sahara - Analysis of a Nonviolent Resistance

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Author Biography

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Abstract

Why are some anti-occupation nonviolent campaigns successful while others are not? The existing literature has identified several factors that help to explain why civil resistance movements are more successful than violent rebellions. However, the relative importance of these factors and their interaction for explaining the success of a campaign have been insufficiently examined. I argue that in anti-occupation campaigns, the international support to the nonviolent participants is a necessary condition for the success of the campaign, while the additive effect of repression, mass participation, and loyalty shifts would also contribute to that outcome. To test this argument, I examine three peaks of mobilization of the nonviolent campaign in Western Sahara. While none of the events under study resulted in a clear success for the nonviolent activists, the lack of strong international support to these participants seems to have limited their ability to achieve self-determination.

Introduction

The prevalence of nonviolent conflicts has increased sharply since the 1960s, to the point where these mass movements have become the main challengers to governments in the present (Chenoweth 2017). This trend is of importance given that, compared to violent insurgencies, nonviolent conflicts can avoid great human suffering.

In terms of reaching political concessions, nonviolent insurgencies have been found to be more successful than violent ones (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008), although the rates of success have decreased since 2010 (Chenoweth 2017). However, while some factors have been identified as being able to explain the differences in success between different nonviolent resistance movements, the *interaction* between these factors and their relative importance in different types of conflicts has not been sufficiently explored. These gaps lead to the question: *why are some anti-occupation nonviolent campaigns successful while others are not?*

The present study aims to contribute to this field by examining the interplay between the strategies employed by the government and the activists, together with the international involvement in the conflict, in order to explain the campaign's outcomes.

Building on the literature examining the factors connected to the success of the nonviolent uprisings, I argue that in territorial and anti-occupation campaigns, the international support to the nonviolent participants is a *necessary* condition for the success of the campaign, while the additive effect of repression, mass participation, and loyalty shifts would also contribute to that outcome.

To test these arguments, an in-depth examination of the case of Western Sahara is carried out. In particular, this case is interesting because the nonviolent struggle experienced different

peaks of mobilization that can be compared, and because the conflict has yet to be concluded by a mutually accepted accord, so that the findings can have relevant policy implications.

In sum, the aim of this work is to analyze the interaction between some of the key factors identified in the previous literature for explaining the success of anti-occupation nonviolent campaigns, by analyzing the case of Western Sahara. The overall findings show that, while none of the events under study resulted in a clear success for the nonviolent activists, the lack of strong international support to the activists limited the chances of a mutually accepted outcome being reached.

The paper is structured in six sections. After this introduction, I will summarize the insights from previous research on the success of nonviolent campaigns, and present the theoretical framework employed in the present work. Next, I will present a background of the conflict in Western Sahara. This is followed by a section where I explore the dynamics of the nonviolent campaign at the Intifadas in 1999 and 2005, and Gdeim Izik in 2010, which were some of the events where the participation was the greatest and compare these cases.

Finally, the main conclusions are presented.

Previous Research

The existing literature on civil resistance has provided convincing explanations for the observation that nonviolent insurgencies are significantly more successful than violent ones (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). In this sense, it has been proposed that the tactical diversity (Sharp 1973), the enhanced domestic and international legitimacy of nonviolent campaigns, and their potential for a more broad-based participation compared to armed insurgencies are some key factors for explaining these differences (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

However, the differences in the level of success between different nonviolent campaigns have been a relatively unexplored question. In this regard, some factors were identified as relevant, but their study has primarily taken place without sufficiently considering the interactions between them, and their relative importance in different types of conflicts has not been sufficiently explored.

The main factors contributing to the success of nonviolent movements are briefly presented in this section, without aiming to be exhaustive in listing the specific mechanisms associated with each of them.

Broad-based participation

First, as mentioned above, the influence of having *broad-based participation* has been highlighted as key for the success of nonviolent campaigns. This factor speaks directly to Sharp's (1973) conception of power as not being monolithic, but as relying on pillars of support, in the sense that a broad-based participation would increase the pressure on the regime for accommodating to the nonviolent goals (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). In this regard, Ackerman and Rodal (2008) concluded that the success of civil resistance depends on its ability to mobilize large amounts of people and from diverse backgrounds.

Repression

Another much emphasized aspect in the literature on nonviolence has been the level of repression against the campaign by the regime, and the effects resulting from this. In this sense, while a common consequence of repressing nonviolent participants is a backfire effect, or *political jiu-jitsu*

(Sharp 1973), recent literature has also emphasized that governments can employ different measures to minimize this effect (Martin 2015, Chenoweth 2017).

According to Sutton et al. (2014), repression is a communicative act which aims to increase the perceived costs for dissent and show regime supporters that the government is taking a hardline approach. However, as stated by Hess and Martin (2006), when repression is perceived as unjust, it can lead to greater mobilization by a movement. Because the perception of a repressive action as being unfair is a subjective element, different authors (Chenoweth 2017, Martin 2015, Sutton et al. 2014) have emphasized the importance of communications and control over the media for justifying or condemning the acts of repression once they take place.

In sum, while a repressive act against a nonviolent campaign has the risk to reduce the perceived legitimacy of the government, thus increasing the chances of success of the civil insurrection, this effect seems to be conditioned by the way in which the repressive event is presented to the public opinion.

Loyalty shifts

In addition to the factors described above, changes in individuals' loyalty from being part of the regime structure to supporting the civil resistance have also been found to be a key aspect for understanding the success of these campaigns (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, Nepstad 2013). In particular, the defections by members of the security forces have been found to be relevant for facilitating success in the campaign (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Although it remains unclear if these defections usually take place in the conflicts where the nonviolent movement was *already* more likely to succeed, the findings in the literature suggest that this factor could add some explanatory power to the conclusion of these outcomes, so that it seems relevant to consider it in the analysis of civil resistance movements.

External support

The transnational component of nonviolent resistance has gained increasing attention in the past few years (Dudouet 2015). In this sense, external actors can provide both material and psychological support to a campaign, signaling that the movement is not alone and that the events are being followed by other actors than the main ones (Bob 2005).

As noted by Schock (2013), where oppressors are not directly dependent upon the oppressed, third parties who link the oppressors with the oppressed are decisive. As an illustration of this line of argumentation, the Palestinians and Kosovar unarmed movements, during the 1980s and 1990s, were not able to employ non-cooperation strategies against the Israeli and Serbian regimes, due to these governments being more interested in controlling the land than in the compliance of the oppressed with their policies (Dudouet 2015).

On the other hand, it should also be acknowledged that the support from external countries to activists can result in accusations of foreign state interference and neo-imperialism, which could undermine the perceived legitimacy of a nonviolent campaign (Dudouet 2015).

In sum, actors external to a nonviolent conflict can have an influence on the success of civil resistance movements by providing material and psychological support to the activists, although they could also undermine the perceived legitimacy of the campaign. In addition, it should be noted that in cases where the oppressors do not directly depend on the oppressed, the role of external actors seems to be more critical for the outcome of the nonviolent conflict, because the

leverage of the activists could have an indirect effect on the regime through these external actors.

Summary
Previous research has attempted to identify the causes that make some civil resistance movements succeed while others do not. While there are mixed arguments and empirical evidence regarding the influence of factors such as the radical flank effect (Sharp 1973, Braithwaite 2014), there is more consensus on the role of broad-based participation, repression, loyalty shifts, and external support to the nonviolent campaign. However, there is still a gap in understanding the interaction between these different factors for predicting the success of the campaigns according to the differences in the type of conflict being studied. Thus, the research question of the present study is: *why are some anti-occupation nonviolent campaigns successful while others are not?*

Theory

In the present work, nonviolent actions are understood as "non-routine political acts that do not involve violence or the threat of violence" (Schock 2013, 277). Thus, a nonviolent campaign is seen here as a mobilization with a maximalist goal, such as secession, anti-occupation, or government change, which is primarily characterized by nonviolent actions. In this study, the focus is on anti-occupation nonviolent campaigns.

In line with Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), I understand the *success* of a nonviolent campaign as the situation where the stated objective by the campaign occurred within a short time frame after the end of the mobilizations, and where the campaign had a discernible effect on the outcomes. A *limited success* would thus refer to obtaining significant concessions short of the stated objective, while *failure* would correspond to the case in which neither the stated objectives or significant concessions are achieved.

Based on the findings presented in the previous section, I argue that broad-based participation, repression, loyalty shifts, and external support have the potential to influence the outcome of anti-occupation civil resistance, but that these factors are not equally relevant. In this sense, because in anti-occupation conflicts the oppressors are not directly dependent upon the oppressed (Schock 2013), I argue that a strong degree of international support to the nonviolent participants is a *necessary* condition for the success of the campaign. This is because, based on Sharp's (1973) conceptualization of power as being dependent on pillars of support, the civil resistance needs the intervention of third parties that are pillars of support of the regime, so that the pressure exerted by the campaign can indirectly affect the government through these actors.

On the other hand, broad participation, the presence of loyalty shifts, and the exposure of repressive acts against the activists would increase the perceived legitimacy of the nonviolent campaign and increase the pressure on the regime for a political change. Thus, the probabilities that the campaign is successful would be increased.

The following section will present a description of the history of the conflict in Western Sahara, in order to contextualize the major nonviolent campaigns occurring after 1991.

Background of the Conflict

The Western Sahara region is considered by many as the last African colony (Murphy and Omar 2013). Traditionally inhabited by nomadic Arab tribes, this area was colonized by Spain between 1884-1976 (Stephan and Mundy 2006). The settled population was referred to as Saharawis (UCDP

2018a). Despite calls by the UN in the early 1970s to set a referendum for deciding the future status of the territory, Spain ceded the administration of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975, both of whom rejected the referendum proposition (UCDP 2018a). Meanwhile, Morocco launched the "Green March", where 350,000 unarmed civilians (UCDP 2018a) and 20,000 Moroccan soldiers (Gómez-Justo 2013) moved into Western Sahara to "reclaim" the territory for Morocco (Stephan & Mundy 2006). In the light of these events, the majority of the Saharawi people fled into exile, primarily to refugee camps led by Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO) in neighboring Algeria (Barca and Zunes 2009).

From guerrilla to strategic nonviolence

The emergence of POLISARIO in 1973 started off an armed conflict against the various occupying forces in Western Sahara, with the aim of self-determination for the Saharawis (Stephan and Mundy 2006). During the first decade, the conflict in the form of guerrilla warfare was successful for the interests of POLISARIO. By 1982, Mauritania had already given up all their territorial claims to the disputed region (UCDP 2018b) and POLISARIO had liberated 85% of the territory of Western Sahara, but an increase in support from the US and France to Morocco changed the dynamics of the conflict (Zunes 2006). With the assistance of these countries, Morocco built a sand-wall of 800 miles which closed off 80% of Western Sahara, limiting the access of POLISARIO to virtually all the territory's major towns and natural resources, and leading the conflict into a military stalemate (Zunes 2006). In 1991, with the promise of holding a referendum the following year, a UN-brokered ceasefire was reached between POLISARIO and the Moroccan government, and the UN established the United Nation Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to oversee the ceasefire and the coming referendum (UCDP 2018a).

However, the referendum did not occur due to different interpretations of the criteria for eligibility to vote (UCDP 2018a), although this did not prevent both parties from honoring the ceasefire. As a consequence, the movement for self-determination continued by nonviolent means, where POLISARIO was recognized as the diplomatic representative of their cause (Barca and Zunes 2009).

Non-Violent Resistance

In the case of Western Sahara, following the UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991, the self-determination movement engaged primarily in the sustained use of nonviolent actions. Thus, a shift from the mainly violent strategy preceding 1991 took place.

However, the nonviolent actions started at least as early as 1987, when a major human rights protest took place in Laayoune, the largest city in Western Sahara, coinciding with the preparations of a UN committee for the proposed referendum (Barca and Zunes 2009). The correspondence between the two events can be related to the element of timing of nonviolent tactics (Sharp 1973), which would suggest that the activists were targeting the UN as their primary audience. More specifically, the focus on the UN can be understood given that the MINURSO had no human rights mandate (Human Rights Watch 2014). This first major nonviolent action already indicates the relevance given by the activists to the role of external actors such as the UN. On a different note, the decision of this protest to focus only on human rights violations can be closely associated with the element of concentration proposed by Sharp (1973). Given the early stage of the nonviolent campaign, limiting the scope of their goals to human rights violations can be seen as an action adapted to their limited means for mobilization and, at the same time, symbolizes the

wider general constraint of the right to self-determination. In the next sections, the three most influential nonviolent mobilizations are examined more closely: the First Intifada, the Second Intifada, and Gdeim Izik. These are also the events in which a large number of people participated in the campaign.

First Intifada (1999)

The death of the Moroccan King, Hassan, in July 1999 and the succession by his son Mohammed VI resulted in improvements in the Moroccan handling of human rights complaints and lead to the formation of numerous civil society organizations (Stephan and Mundy 2006). Despite these improvements, dozens of Saharawi students organized a sit-in demonstration in September 1999 demanding more scholarships and transportation subsidies to Moroccan universities (Stephan and Mundy 2006). They set up tents in a central square of Laayoune and were soon joined by former Saharawi political prisoners, Saharawi workers from the phosphate mines and others (Stephan and Mundy 2006).

Broad participation

A first aspect to consider in this event is the degree of broad participation. In self-determination disputes, the grievances of the population regarding economic and political discrimination increase both the likelihood of experiencing armed and nonviolent conflicts (Cunningham 2013). This condition seemed to be present during the First Intifada, with claims of the activists related to economic and social inequalities suffered by the Saharawis (Stephan and Mundy 2006).

Another explanation for the mass mobilization could be the potential for resource mobilization. The openness of the Moroccan regime since the reign of Mohammed VI and the rapid creation of various civil society organizations could have facilitated the potential for mobilizing support, thus increasing the probability of a mass-based nonviolent action starting.

Further, there were new conditions of political opportunity. Political transitions constitute an opportunity for nonviolent uprisings (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015), so that in the case of Western Sahara, the death of King Hassan could have been interpreted as an opportunity for seeking change. In addition, as proposed by Levitsky and Way in their 2010 study (cited in Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015), new freedoms may allow some people to participate who would be too afraid under other conditions. Thus, the openness of the new King regarding human rights could have encouraged more civilians to join the mobilization who would otherwise have considered it too costly.

An interesting aspect of this nonviolent event was that the Saharawi organizers deliberately limited their demands to social and economic issues (Stephan and Mundy 2006). I argue that this focus on specific goals facilitated the participation of civilians who did not necessarily share the broader goal of self-determination. This would partially explain why poor Moroccan settlers, especially those of Saharawi origin, joined the uprising during the First Intifada (Stephan and Mundy 2006).

External support

In addition, the geographical location of the demonstration was also remarkable. Sharp (1973) pointed out the potential importance of selecting specific places with high symbolic value. The choice of a sit-in at a central square of Laayoune had at least two symbolic purposes: it was placed in front of a hotel which hosted a large proportion of MINURSO's personnel, and it was the same

square where Spanish forces killed dozens of Saharawi demonstrators back in 1970 (Stephan and Mundy 2006).

Consequently, the location of the sit-in directed the attention towards the UN as a potential ally within their 'coalition building' strategy, and associated the present action with a previous event where Saharawis demanded self-determination. Thus, despite focusing on social and economic claims, it was clear that the demonstrations were testing the conditions for broader demands and participation (Barca and Zunes 2009), which is also a strategy described by Sharp (1973).

In a broader sense, it should also be noted that the civil resistance in Western Sahara had already received different types of external support. For instance, Algeria played an important role in providing refuge within its boundaries to the POLISARIO camps (Human Rights Watch 2014). In addition, another variety of external support has been the recognition by many countries of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), declared by POLISARIO in 1976. By 2009, it was recognized by almost eighty countries (Barca & Zunes 2009) and the SADR has been a full member state of the African Union, previously the Organization for African Unity, since 1984 (Zunes 2006).

Further, prominent activists such as Aminatou Haidar and Algaliya Djimi began meetings with international NGOs and representatives of foreign embassies to discuss issues related to human rights (Barca and Zunes 2009), potentially gaining legitimacy for the nonviolent campaign.

Repression

After twelve days of nonviolent sit-ins, the Moroccan police conducted acts of repression against the activists in the forms of beatings and tear-gassing (Stephan & Mundy 2006). Moreover, the police forces arrested dozens of demonstrators, some of which reported torture in custody (Amnesty International 2000), and reportedly dumped some of them in the desert, miles out of town (Stephan and Mundy 2006). As a result, five days later a larger demonstration was organized, which included pro-referendum and pro-independence slogans (Stephan and Mundy 2006).

As mentioned in the section reviewing the contributions from previous research, some scholars have emphasized that the political jiu-jitsu resulting from a repressive act by the regime depends on the way this is transmitted to the broader population, so that the control of the media for justifying/condemning a repressive act is a key factor (Chenoweth 2017, Martin 2015, Sutton et al. 2014).

In this regard, Morocco restricted the media access to the occupied territory since 1975, thus maintaining strict control over the flow of information from and into the region (Stephan and Mundy 2006). By doing so, Morocco could put into practice the tactic that Martin (2015) calls covering up the repressive act. However, as journalists enjoyed improved access to Western Sahara in 1999 (Amnesty International 2000), the news reached the international community and the US State Department condemned the excessive violence of the Moroccan forces (Stephan and Mundy 2006). As a result, a larger demonstration followed and the Moroccan government removed the governor and local chief of police (Stephan and Mundy 2006).

This effect of political jiu-jitsu is in line with the finding of Sutton et al. (2014) that the pre-existence of a campaign infrastructure increases the likelihood of augmented domestic mobilization after violent repression. However, the Moroccans crushed the demonstration within a few months (Barca and Zunes 2009).

While the literature on political jiu-jitsu has focused primarily on its effects regarding mobilization (i.e. Hess and Martin 2006) and security defections (Sutton et al. 2014), an interesting feature of the demonstrations that followed the repression during the First Intifada was the

polarization of the goals that were pursued in the forms of calls for a referendum and for independence. Therefore, these events illustrate the polarization of goals as a potential additional effect of political jiu-jitsu.

Success

The First Intifada cannot be considered as a success for the interests of the civil resistance, from the point of view that the main goal of self-determination for the Saharawis in the form of a referendum or independence did not follow from these events in 1999.

However, such a referendum was scheduled to take place in July of the next year, but did not occur due to disagreements with the Moroccan government on the census to be utilized. Thus, it is complicated to draw conclusions on whether the final failure to hold the referendum can be attributed to the features of the campaign, or if this should be considered as successful to some degree, because a referendum was to be held.

It should be noted that Morocco moved more than 200,000 settlers into Western Sahara (Barca and Zunes 2009), resulting in these citizens outnumbering the indigenous Saharawis by a ratio of two to one (Zunes 2006, Stephan and Mundy 2006). This became a constant barrier when negotiating who should be included in the census of the referendum on the status of Western Sahara (UCDP 2018a).

By looking at the factors discussed in the theory section, the First Intifada was defined by a broad and large number of participants, although no loyalty shifts were reported at that time. Regarding the levels of constraint, it should be noted that the internationally condemned repression against the activists resulted in the removal of a local governor and chief of police (Stephan and Mundy 2006). However, this fell short of the maximalist goal of self-determination.

As for the level of international support, it should be noted that the mass mobilizations taking place in the occupied territory in 1999 targeted the UN personnel as their audience, in a symbolic act in front of their hotel. Arguably, the goal of the activists was to exert pressure on MINURSO for the effective holding of a referendum that was already planned. However, while MINURSO continued working on the implementation of a referendum until 2000, this plan was halted due to its weak leadership and mandate, and because of the key influence of France and the US from the UN Security Council (Stephan and Zunes 2006).

Thus, despite receiving an important degree of support, particularly from other African nations, the leverage of France and the US at the UN prevented the mission to fulfill its mandate in 2000 as previously agreed.

Second Intifada (2005)

By 2001, the Internet and mobile phones became widely available in the occupied territory, thus facilitating the breaking of news and communications between activists (Barca & Zunes 2009). In this sense, the ability for resource mobilization at this point could be assumed to be higher than before, and from 1999 to 2005, sporadic and small demonstrations continued in Western Sahara (Stephan and Mundy 2006).

However, the magnitude of these demonstrations increased in 2004, when the release of a respected Saharawi activist after 30 years in prison resulted in massive public celebrations in the occupied region, which included the most explicit calls for independence up to that time (Barca and Zunes 2009).

In addition, flags of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) were put overnight along major streets (Barca & Zunes 2009). This tactical innovation can be understood as a strategy for increasing the resilience of the movement, which is the "ability of a challenge to withstand and recover from repression" (Schock 2013, 283). In particular, placing the flags during the nights could reduce the probability of facing direct repression by the Moroccan forces, while at the same time expressing the goal of self-determination.

It was in May 2005, however, when a different event set the ground for the Second Intifada. Morocco initiated the transfer of a popular Saharawi prisoner from Laayoune to southern Morocco, thus preventing his family from visiting him (Stephan and Mundy 2006). In response to this action, the prisoner's family and a small group of Saharawi activists demonstrated outside the prison (Stephan and Mundy 2006). They were forcefully dispersed by the Moroccan forces, but a larger demonstration was organized later that day, where Saharawis shouted pro-independence slogans and flew POLISARIO flags (Stephan and Mundy 2006).

Broad participation

The transfer of the Saharawi prisoner to southern Morocco can be seen as a 'moral shock'. Jasper (1998) (cited in Hess and Martin 2006) considered a moral shock as that event which triggers a public reaction. From a study on participation in a peasant movement in El Salvador, Wood (2003) emphasized the moral and emotional reasons for engaging in insurgent collective action. These motivations seemed to be also relevant for overcoming collective action problems in Western Sahara. The case of the relocation of the Saharawi prisoner had a strong emotional component, resulting in an immediate protest.

On a different note, the question of who participated in these demonstrations is also of relevance. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) highlighted not only the importance of mass participation in nonviolent campaigns, but also that of the diversity of their participants. The more diverse the participants, the more difficult it is for the regime to isolate the activists and adopt a repressive strategy which is short of being indiscriminate (Schock 2005, Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

In the case of the Second Intifada, the increasing participation of women and the elderly in the demonstrations, and the excessive force directed against them, resulted in the growth of support for the movement, even among some Moroccan settlers and ethnic Saharawis in southern Morocco (Barca and Zunes 2009).

In this regard, using force against these specific groups was a particular affront in Islamic societies (Barca and Zunes 2009), which may have fueled a stronger political jiu-jitsu effect. For instance, Aminatou Haidar, a local and international icon among the activists, was allegedly assaulted in 2005 by the security forces while going to a peaceful demonstration in Laayoune (Amnesty International 2005). Allegedly, the Moroccan forces confiscated her mobile phone and beat her around the head with batons (Amnesty International 2005).

Repression

At the second mobilization, some demonstrators burned tires and threw stones at the Moroccan forces (Stephan and Mundy 2006). At the same time, a series of violent crackdowns by the Moroccan regime led to new demonstrations spreading around the territory and growing in size, reaching the cities of Smara, Dakhla, and the southern Moroccan cities of Tan Tan and Assa (Stephan and Mundy 2006). That same month, thousands of Saharawi demonstrators led by women

and youth took to the streets of Laayoune to protest the ongoing occupation and demand independence (Barca and Zunes 2009).

The above-described series of events illustrates what is known as the 'Punishment Puzzle' (Davenport 2007). When an opposition group challenges the status quo of the regime, authorities usually employ some form of repressive action but, at the same time, this repression has inconsistent effects on dissent (Davenport 2007). In the present series of events, the security forces systematically responded with violent repressive acts, even if this resulted in a backfire effect leading to increased mobilization among the activists. Moreover, both the behavior and the expressed goals of the activists became more radical following the events of police repression. Therefore, this case gives support to the hypothesis of a political jiu-jitsu effect in the form of radicalization of goals by the opposition.

Further, Aminatou Haidar was not the only leader who was targeted by the Moroccan regime. Only some hours after the massive demonstrations in May 2005, the Moroccan forces kidnapped and forced the disappearance of leading Saharawi activists (Barca & Zunes 2009). As argued by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), the regime can raise the costs of continued participation by removing key members of the campaign and continuously counterattacking. Thus, by targeting specific leaders of the movement, Morocco would expect to undermine the organization of the resistance and, thus, decrease further mobilization efforts. However, it is hard to assess the effectiveness of this strategy, since mobilizations continued throughout 2005, all of which were met with harsh responses (Barca and Zunes 2009).

On a different note, as an illustration of the importance of controlling the media from reporting repressive acts, the Moroccan authorities prevented foreign delegations from entering the occupied territory and expelled journalists after the outbreak of the 2005 intifada (Stephan and Mundy 2006), with the intention to lower those voices reporting on the instability and abuses committed in the Western Sahara territory.

Repression and tactical diversity

Interestingly, after the large and prolonged demonstrations in 2005 were broken up by force, the resistance started opting primarily for smaller protests, both planned and spontaneous (Barca and Zunes 2009). At least one minor public act of protest or symbolic resistance would take place each day somewhere in Western Sahara, although the movement was still the most active in the largest cities (Barca and Zunes 2009). A typical protest would begin in a square with someone unfolding a Saharawi flag, women starting to ululate, and people shouting pro-independence slogans (Barca & Zunes 2009). Within a few minutes, the security forces would arrive and the crowd would quickly disband (Barca and Zunes 2009).

This change of strategy exemplifies the phenomenon of tactical diversification. Cunningham (2017) argued that organizations do not only copy previous types of actions but, instead, they can diversify their tactics depending on their resources and proximate goals.

The strategy of the activists to run small demonstrations as they did allowed them to take the initiative in the actions, as well as to introduce an element of surprise, both of which are important strategic factors pointed out by Sharp (1973). In addition, disbanding the demonstrations was a useful tactic for avoiding repression by the security forces, thus making the movement more resilient. The diversification of the constellation of tactics which avoided repression was also evident through the use of boycotts of Moroccan products (Stephan and Mundy 2006), leafleting, graffiti, and cultural celebrations with political overtones (Barca and Zunes 2009).

Success

Once again, the nonviolent campaign did not result in the fulfilment of the Saharawi's demand for self-determination. It should be noted that, since the previous Intifada, Morocco had rejected a plan for a five-year period of autonomy followed by a referendum, as proposed by mediator James Baker (Stephen and Mundy 2006). In addition, the US and France blocked the UN from enforcing its mandate, which was in line with international law (Stephen and Mundy 2006).

It should be acknowledged that in 2007, the government of Morocco offered the possibility of a permanent autonomy of Western Sahara under the Moroccan state (Fernández-Molina 2015). However, while this could be seen as a significant concession by the regime, it took place two years after the Second Intifada, and it is therefore doubtful that this campaign was the cause behind the new offer. In addition, the proposal was rejected, initiating more protests that were referred to as the Saharawi Intifada (Fernández-Molina 2015).

Regarding the other factors of interest, the Second Intifada, together with the first one, shared the fact that it consisted of a broad and large number of participants, that there were no reported loyalty shifts, and that the levels of repression were significantly high. In this case, however, there were also some violent actions on behalf of some of the demonstrators.

As opposed to the previous major mobilization, in this case the continued repression by the government did not directly end the campaign, since different tactics were employed by the activists. Nevertheless, the Second Intifada did not manage to bring about a significant political change.

Thus, it seems plausible that the ability of the Moroccan regime to maintain their allegiance with UNSC members such as the US and France, while exerting repression against the demonstrators with impunity, allowed them to preserve the status quo after the Second Intifada.

Gdeim Izik (2010)

In October 2010, a group of Saharawi activists organized a protest camp known as Gdeim Izik, 12 kilometers outside of Laayoune (Dann 2014). Saharawi families throughout the region gathered in the desert to protest against the economic and social discrimination faced under the Moroccan occupation (Dann 2014), cautiously avoiding displaying flags or giving it an explicit pro-independence meaning (Fernández-Molina 2015). Although the protest camp began with 60 people, one month later there were over 20,000 people, although the number of residents in the camps varied notably (Dann 2014).

In November 2010 the Moroccan police surrounded the camp in the early morning demanding the protestors to disperse (Dann 2014). The police forces started to destroy the tents and confront the activists with water cannons, batons, fire, and tear gas (Dann 2014). This intervention provoked rioting and violence which spread to the city of Laayoune (Fernández-Molina 2015), resulting in young Saharawi men physically attacking security forces, setting fire to buildings (Dann 2014) and causing the death of at least 11 Moroccan security forces (Porges and Leuprecht 2016). On the other hand, POLISARIO reported that the Moroccan forces caused 19 people dead, 723 wounded and 159 disappeared (CNN 2010).

Broad participation

Different aspects about this peak of contention call for a closer focus. First, because some people would work in Laayoune during the week and join the protest camp on the weekends (Dann 2014), the movement allowed for broad participation among people with different needs and levels of

commitment, which is an advantage for mobilization in nonviolent campaigns compared to violent insurgencies (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Second, after a period of explicit pro-independence acts of nonviolence, Gdeim Izik was defined by the concentration on socio-economic claims. As Sharp (1973) argued, concentration tactics can only be effective when the claims symbolize wider general conditions. In Gdeim Izik, this was clear as the activists linked their socio-economic complaints to alleged discrimination against indigenous Saharawis (Fernández- Molina 2015) and used symbolic elements linked to the Saharawi culture.

Repression

Regarding the location of the camp, distanced from the city of Laayoune, this could be seen as a strategy to avoid the level of security control in the city (Fernández-Molina 2015). This tactic would prevent direct confrontations with the Moroccan forces, as did most of the nonviolent actions since the end of the Second Intifada.

Regarding the violent acts of repression by the security forces, they were successful in dismantling the protest camp, but it is unclear whether it resulted in increased mobilization by the opposition movement (Fernández-Molina 2015). Interestingly, the Moroccan authorities employed some of the methods proposed by Martin (2015) to reduce the occurrence of political jiu-jitsu after the repressive act. The Moroccan Interior Minister claimed that the camp was under the control of criminals and POLISARIO members who were holding women and children hostage (Dann 2014).

By portraying the Gdeim Izik camp as run by criminal actors, the Moroccan authorities could justify the repressive act, appealing to the strategies of devaluating the other, reinterpreting the event, and establishing a rational threat (Martin 2015). In this sense, they probably intended to reduce the element of identification with the targeted group, which is one of the reasons for why people give consent (Sharp 1973). Although the foreign press had very limited access to events in the region, the activists were able to report human right abuses through amateur photos and videos from camera phones, using the Internet (Dann 2014), and thus showing an alternative interpretation of the events

To understand the severe and violent responses by some of the activists in the face of repression, the main argument in this regard is that there appeared to be little systematic emphasis in maintaining nonviolent discipline through the movement in Western Sahara (Barca and Zunes 2009). In addition, large numbers of participants may be a disadvantage in terms of sacrificing discipline and reliability of the participants (Sharp 1973). At the Gdeim Izik camp, the massive participation could have undermined the already fragile nonviolent discipline of the movement, thus initiating a resort to violence and violating what Sharp (1973) considered a key aspect for success.

Success

The Gdeim Izik protest did not result in the effective right for self-determination in Western Sahara, nor did it lead to significant concessions by the government. Compared to the previous mobilizations, this protest was marked by events of deadly violence perpetrated by both sides.

The size of this protest was considerably large, with up to 20,000 participants, and allowed for broad-based participation, in a similar way as the previous campaigns. However, the Gdeim Izik took place in the shadow of increasing violence, which was followed by the respective interpretations to the media by the two sides, justifying their positions. Once again, no loyalty shifts were reported in this case.

In sum, the large amount of participation in this nonviolent campaign, and the selection of a space to avoid direct confrontation, did not prevent a violent scenario which put an end to the camp and the hopes for political change by the participants.

Comparison of the Cases

The three major events analyzed in the present study were the First Intifada, the Second Intifada, and the Gdeim Izik camp. These peaks in the mobilization of activists correspond to what Tarrow (2011) labeled as 'cycles of contention,' which, he argues, often start with early demands that are narrow and group-specific, as it was the case in the three cases analyzed in this paper. The First Intifada started with a protest for scholarships and transportation, the Second as a protest against the transfer of a Saharawi prisoner (Stephan & Mundy 2006), and the Gdeim Izik camp was initiated in relation to claims for social and economic reforms (Dann 2014).

These three cases share some important features, such as their ability to mobilize broadly based participation and their lack of effectiveness in provoking loyalty shifts in the regime members. In particular, this apparent absence of loyalty shifts in the three campaigns under study calls for a closer examination.

Absence of loyalty shifts

I argue that an explanation for this lack of security defections could be found in the ethnic dimensions adopted within the conflict. In this regard, there was a criminalization of the cultural aspects defining the Saharawi people, which was responded to by the activists through assertions of their cultural features during the campaign.

In particular, it should be noted that the Moroccan authorities banned the use of Hassaniya, the Saharawi dialect (Murphy and Omar 2013), and the placement of jaimas in the desert (Dann 2014), which are traditional Saharawi tents and symbols of Saharawi culture (Murphy and Omar 2013). Most importantly, people were tortured because of identifying themselves as Saharawis and not as Moroccans (Beristain and González-Hidalgo 2012). On the other hand, the Saharawis used this ethnic and cultural dimension of the conflict as part of their nonviolent campaign. For instance, some actions during the Second Intifada involved walking on the streets wearing only traditional Saharawi clothes (Stephan and Mundy 2006) and, at the Gdeim Izik camp, they placed 4,500 jaimas at the desert and turned these objects into a symbol of resistance and non-cooperation (Dann 2014).

According to McLauchlin (2010), favoring one ethnic group within the security forces increases the likelihood of these members remaining loyal, but it also enhances the cohesion of ethnic out-groups. Thus, assuming that most of the members of the security forces were ethnic Moroccans, all the above would reduce the chances of them defecting to support the civil insurrection.

Responses to repression

An aspect that varied more between the different campaigns was their ability to respond to repressive acts. In this sense, while all three campaigns faced a strong coercive response by the regime, their strategies regarding this violence diverged significantly. For instance, in the First Intifada the activists apparently managed to maintain the nonviolent discipline, and the coverage of that event led to the resignation of two people seen as responsible for the action, after receiving international condemnation. While the backfire effect of violence did not lead to the culmination

of the self-determination goal, this example does illustrate a certain degree of political jiu-jitsu. However, it should be noted that the mobilizations ended as a result of continued repression by the Moroccan regime.

In comparison to these dynamics, the Second Intifada first responded to the repression with some confrontation, later on diversifying their tactics, avoiding mass concentrations and direct disputes with the security forces. Finally, while the Gdeim Izik camp was placed strategically to prevent direct confrontations, these took place in a more severe way than in the previous campaigns, involving various killings and ending the mobilizations.

External support

As previously mentioned, Schock (2013) noted that where oppressors are not directly dependent upon the oppressed, third parties who link the oppressors with the oppressed are decisive. Because in Western Sahara the Saharawi people had limited economic leverage over Morocco (Stephan and Mundy 2006), the role of external actors is understood as being a key factor for the lack of success of the campaigns under study.

It should be kept in mind that the International Court of Justice and the UN asserted the right of self-determination of the Saharawi people in 1975 (Stephan and Mundy 2006), but the MINURSO was not able to organize the referendum over the final status of the territory, which is a right under international law (Fisera 2004).

As previously discussed, this can be understood by considering the influence of France and the US at the UNSC for blocking the enforcement of MINURSO's mandate (Stephan and Mundy 2006). As previously discussed, these two countries prevented the finalization of MINURSO's task in 2000, the same year that potentially lucrative reserves of oil were found in the coast of Western Sahara (Fisera 2004).

As Dudouet (2015) noted, third-party support to nonviolent movements may concern the strategic or economic interests that they might represent. In a similar way, I argue that the absence of such assistance could also be motivated by economic or strategic reasons, as in the present case.

In this situation, if we consider these actors as being strategic in an economic sense, they would only change their allegiance in the Western Sahara conflict if they expect the nonviolent campaign to succeed in the short term. Instead, they blocked the referendum solution and, in 2001, a French and an American firm signed reconnaissance licenses with Rabat (Fisera 2004).

Thus, even when the SADR was recognized by a significant number of countries and had representation at organizations such as the African Union, it seems like their success as a civil resistance movement was more dependent on countries with veto power at the UNSC, given that the body with the mandate to organize the referendum was the MINURSO. In particular, it should be noted that the First Intifada was the campaign that ended with the closest scenario for a referendum, scheduled to take place in 2000, but which did not take place primarily due to the France and US decision, coinciding with a hypothesized increase in their economic relations with Morocco.

Conclusion

Why are some anti-occupation nonviolent campaigns successful while others are not? The present study aimed at contributing to that debate by examining three nonviolent campaigns in Western Sahara, as a case of an anti-occupation civil resistance movement.

In particular, the asymmetrical dependence between the Saharawis and Morocco (Stephan & Mundy 2006), together with a lack of security defections, and with the limits of external support, mostly regarding the implementation of the MINURSO mandate, seem to have limited the success of the campaigns.

The findings of this study provide some degree of support the main argument that external support may be a necessary condition for the success of anti-occupation nonviolent campaigns. However, because I could not find variation in terms of loyalty shifts between the cases, it could be that this factor is also behind the lack of success at the mobilizations. Future research could complement the insights from the present work by exploring additional cases of nonviolent anti-occupation movements.

Regarding the conflict in Western Sahara, given the humanitarian situation of the more than 100,000 refugees living outside their homeland, increased political efforts seem to be required. In particular, a mutually acceptable solution in accordance with humanitarian law would contribute to the prevention of vulnerable groups engaging in armed conflict (Chikhi 2017, International Crisis Group 2007, Beristain & González-Hidalgo 2012), as well resulting in an improvement in the living conditions of the many people affected by this conflict.

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